Several proposals have been launched under the new concept 'integrative taxonomy' to frame the future development of species discovery and description. We consider that some of those proposals have failed to be truly integrative, by not acknowledging the limitations of operational definitions of species, by defending some kinds of evidence as universally superior, by considering taxonomy to be irreconcilable with population genetics, or by ignoring that the heterogeneity of evolutionary processes often precludes full character congruence in species. Here we defend a taxonomy where species exist, but not in any particular way everyone might want them to exist; a taxonomy open to data and methods from population biology, phylogeography and phylogenetics, as well as any other discipline providing evidence about the origin and evolution of species. This new taxonomy embraces all the consequences of considering species as lineages of reproductive populations, encouraging the use of as many lines of evidence as possible, but without negating that a single line may also be the only one providing evidence for a particular species. Species cannot only be those reproductive populations showing broad character congruence and/or reproductive isolation, due to the different degrees of character congruence, as well as of reproductive isolation, that result from the heterogeneity of evolutionary processes causing lineage splitting and divergence. Also, any kind of character -and not only those established by tradition or fashion -is potentially relevant as evidence of lineage divergence. To conciliate the authors who only see species supported by broad character congruence as good species hypotheses, we explain how a hypothesis can gain corroboration using single or multiple lines of evidence, even in cases of discordance with other lines of evidence. Finally, we propose guidelines to identify the expected degree of stability (preliminary, unstable, and stable) of species hypotheses.
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In a series of recent articles, several taxonomists have discussed the ways in which we should construct a new and more integrative taxonomy (Dayrat, 2005; Will, Mishler & Wheeler, 2005; Meier, 2008; Valdecasas, Williams & Wheeler, 2008; Wheeler, 2008) . Also, a considerable number of systematists have now begun to adopt the term 'integrative taxonomy' to frame their use of different lines of evidence for discovering and delimiting species (e.g. Mengual et al., 2006; Lanzone, Ojeda & Gallardo, 2007; Roe & Sperling, 2007; Alström et al., 2008; Fonseca, Derycke & Moens, 2008; Cardoso, Serrano & Vogler, 2009; Castroviejo-Fisher, Guayasamín & Kok, 2009a; Castroviejo-Fisher et al., 2009b; Gibbs, 2009; Puillandre et al., 2009; Vieites et al., 2009; Glaw et al., 2010; Lumley & Sperling, 2010; Tan et al., 2010; review by Schlick-Steiner et al., 2010) . In general, most authors share the view that it is necessary to construct a more integrative species taxonomy that is able to handle evidence, data, and methods originally developed by other biological disciplines, such as population genetics, phylogeography, and phylogenetics. Nonetheless, some disagreements remain about which kind of evidence better identifies species, what level of divergence and congruence among characters is necessary to consider a population or group of populations as distinct species, and, ultimately, when names should be given (Dayrat, 2005; Meiri & Mace, 2007; Alström et al., 2008; Valdecasas et al., 2008; Cardoso et al., 2009; .
Here, we suggest that an integrative taxonomy should be able to unify knowledge, data, and methods from population biology, phylogeography, and phylogenetics, as well as any other discipline investigating the origin and evolution of species. We will argue that to do so, taxonomists should: (1) embrace the conceptual framework of species as lineages of reproductive populations (the evolutionary species concept; hereafter, ESC); (2) consider all sources of evidence as potentially useful to discover and support species; and (3) abandon the idea that species are only those reproductive populations showing broad character congruence or reproductive isolation. We discuss the points where we consider that recent proposals for the development of taxonomy have failed to be truly integrative by not acknowledging the limitations of operational definitions of species, or by ignoring that the heterogeneity of the evolutionary processes often precludes full character congruence in species or reproductive isolation. Furthermore, we explain how a hypothesis can gain corroboration using a single line of evidence, even in cases of discordance with other lines of evidence (following Faith, 2004 (following Faith, , 2007 . Finally, we comment on some consequences of our proposal for users of species names, and suggest practical guidelines to identify the degree of stability that can be expected for species hypotheses.
THE EVOLUTIONARY SPECIES CONCEPT
'An evolutionary species is a single lineage of ancestor-descendant populations of organisms which maintains its identity from other such lineages and which has its own evolutionary tendencies and historical fate' (Wiley, 1978: 18; modified from Simpson, 1961: 153) . Under this theoretical perspective, species exist and evolve independently of our ability to discover them, and are discoverable to the degree that footprints of their evolutionary history allow us to infer their existence (Ghiselin, 1975; Wiley, 1978; Hull, 1980; Frost & Kluge, 1994) . The point of separation from the sister lineage is what marks the origin of a species (Wiley, 1978; Wiens, 2004) , and neither subspecies nor 'subspeciation' are logically needed (Wilson & Brown, 1953; Wiley, 1978; Frost & Kluge, 1994; de Queiroz, 2005) . Described and named species (species taxa) represent hypotheses on the existence of lineages, which can be tested in fact or in principle (Wiley, 1978) . Properties of lineages (i.e. of organisms composing those lineages) that were previously considered as necessary to define species (for example, reproductive isolation, monophyly, and morphological distinctiveness) are considered contingent properties depending on the particular evolutionary trajectory of a lineage (Mayden, 1997 (Mayden, , 2002 de Queiroz, 1998 de Queiroz, , 2005 de Queiroz, , 2007 . These contingent properties are lines of evidence that allow the discovery of separately evolving lineages. Even a single line of evidence can be used to propose an initial species hypothesis, as long as it suggests that a group of individuals is likely to represent a distinct evolutionary path (Wiley, 1978; de Queiroz, 2007) . Incongruence between lines of evidence can be expected because, as a result of the heterogeneity of evolutionary processes affecting lineage splitting and divergence, biological properties do not necessarily arise and change in a particular order or degree (Wiley, 1978) .
We consider that this conceptual framework of species as lineages should form the basis for a truly integrative taxonomy. Indeed, the view of species as population or metapopulation lineages has already gained broad acceptance among evolutionary biologists (e.g. Hey, 2006; de Queiroz, 2007; Knowles & Carstens, 2007; Wiens, 2007; Mallet, 2008; Petit & Excoffier, 2009; Degnan & Rosenberg, 2009) , with the most illustrative example of this trend probably being the unification of the theory of population biology and phylogenetics under coalescent theory. This trend has already begun to affect taxonomy, and now an increasing number of taxonomic studies exemplify how methods grounded in population genetics can be used to infer the existence and the degree of cohesion of species (e.g. Bond & Stockman, 2008; Monaghan et al., 2009; Leaché et al., 2009; Dávalos & Porzecanski, 2009 ; see also other studies reviewed by Sites & Marshall, 2004) , which makes us wonder why Valdecasas et al. (2008 ), or Wheeler (2008 consider taxonomy and population biology as irreconcilable.
Many systematists might disagree with our position, and would argue that more operational conceptual frameworks provide more accurate ways for 'discovering' species (e.g. Nixon & Wheeler, 1990; Mallet, 1995; Stamos, 2003; Fitzhugh, 2005; Wheeler, 2008) . Operationality implies that some contingent properties are considered properties that species must have in order to exist. Put circularly, species do not exist if we are not able to detect the properties we have decided they must have in order to exist. Thus, operationality is appreciated by those who wish species to be nicely separated, observable, and identifiable (e.g. Meiri & Mace, 2007; Alström et al., 2008; Valdecasas et al., 2008) , contrary to what we usually expect from other biological entities such as populations or metapopulations. From our point of view, the demand for pure operationality is the major cause of the long and unproductive search for the 'golden species concept', which has resulted in generalized skepticism among some biologists about the possibility that any species 'concept' might satisfy every expectation (e.g. Marris, 2007 Vieites et al. (2009) , which does not consider completely necessary the congruence of lines of evidence to discover species, but that for practical reasons suggest naming only those for which congruence is demonstrable. We agree that congruence is desirable because it makes our discoveries more reliable: few of us would doubt the existence of a species if it is reproductively isolated, is morphologically different, and if several independent loci support a history of divergence. But the value of that congruence does not rely on the congruent pattern itself, but on the degree of character independence, because congruence can emerge just by chance or, more importantly, as the result of manyand not mutually exclusive -evolutionary phenomena, such as pleiotropy, linkage disequilibrium, allometry, or heterochrony (Emerson & Hastings, 1998) .
However, full congruence cannot be demanded a priori, because the process of speciation is not always accompanied by character change at all levels (e.g. Adams et al., 2009) , and lineage divergence depends on heterogeneous evolutionary factors. For example, a growing body of evidence shows that discordance among loci genealogies, and between species trees and gene trees, is a common situation caused by evolutionary processes such as incomplete lineage sorting, hybridization, gene duplication, recombination, or natural selection (Degnan & Rosenberg, 2009) . Moreover, intrinsic factors such as body size, population dynamics, life history (Bromham, 2009) , and effective population size (Woolfit, 2009 ) affect the rate of molecular evolution of species, and morphological trait evolution also differs among species because of intrinsic or extrinsic properties (e.g. Cooper & Purvis, 2009 ). In addition to this, the intensity of natural or sexual selection may decouple the rate of evolution in certain traits. Disruptive selection can produce morphologically distinct sympatric and parapatric species before they become reciprocally monophyletic and reproductively isolated (e.g. Nosil, Harmon & Seehausen, 2009) . Character displacement can also vary the degree of differentiation between two species depending on them being in sympatry or allopatry (Dayan & Simberloff, 2005) . In other cases, neutral processes such as genetic drift promote genetic differentiation in spite of morphological stasis (e.g. Sturmbauer & Meyer, 1992) , or can lead to rapid evolution of hybrid dysfunction despite morphological stasis (Presgraves, 2010) . Also, the pace at which reproductive isolation is attained depends on the rate of fixation of genes with epistatic effect (Schluter, 2009; Presgraves, 2010) , which can proceed more or less rapidly under different circumstances: e.g. it can be rapid in allopatry (Fitzpatrick, 2002) , sympatry, or parapatry (reviewed by Nosil et al., 2009 ) under divergent selection, or even under a neutral scenario (Presgraves, 2010) . This heterogeneity in the evolutionary history of species can produce situations in which species within a clade may show disparate degrees of divergence and reproductive isolation among them, equivalent to those shown among populations of species in other clades, something already alleged by Wilson & Brown (1953) in their criticism of subspecies.
For all of these reasons, the application of arbitrary thresholds to 'discover' species -not only for DNA (e.g. Hebert et al., 2003) but also for any other character system -is incompatible with the ESC. Thus, the proposal that the degree of morphological divergence shown by sympatric and reproductively isolated species represents the 'threshold' that makes an entity merit species status (Meiri & Mace, 2007) is not supported. Similarly, the claim that '. . . what is important in taxonomy is to establish a minimum verifiable difference according to what is known about the nature of variation in the group under study . . .' (Valdecasas et al., 2008: 215) is insupportable if one accepts the validity of the ESC. Thresholds may be useful to pinpoint groups of specimens of interest for further study (Padial & De la Riva, 2007; Vieites et al., 2009 ), but minimum levels of divergence for certain traits cannot be demanded for species recognition under the ESC.
Taxonomy under the ESC encourages the use of as many lines of evidence as possible, but does not SPECIES TAXONOMY 749 negate the possibility that a single line may be the only one providing evidence for a particular species. Concordances and discordances among lines of evidence should always be explained from the particular evolutionary perspective of the populations under study, which can lead to the recognition of a species on the basis of a single set of characters if the characters are considered good indicators of lineage divergence. But congruence, even if expected in many cases -and certainly desirable -cannot be theoretically demanded.
CHARACTERS: THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE UGLY
An important consequence of an integrative taxonomy based on the ESC is that characters are neither universally good nor bad because they do not make evolutionary species. Under the ESC, species are not constructs based on our observations of patterns of character variation. Instead, they are diverging lineages of reproductive populations, and any organismal trait that evolved as a result of the independent trajectory of the reproductive population to which the organism belongs can be used to propose a species hypothesis. Taxonomists need to determine whether some historical processes that cause lineage divergence can explain the observed discontinuities in character variation or if, contrarily, they are better explained by other evolutionary phenomena. Evidently, characters mediating pre-or postmating reproductive isolation immediately evidence lineage divergence, and constitute robust inferences about separate species. As an example, differences in colour mediating mate choice can have an important role for discovering species, because they are the result or the cause of lineage divergence (e.g. Seehausen et al., 2008; Uy et al., 2009 ). But differences in fixed morphological characters between sets of specimens are also useful for discovering species because they provide evidence of reduced or absent gene flow (Wiens & Servedio, 2000) . Similarly, DNA sequences are relevant for discovering species because we can infer gene genealogies indicative of the historical processes that divided lineages (Avise, 2000; Templeton, 2001; Knowles & Carstens, 2007) , or because we can directly identify the genes responsible for reproductive isolation (Orr, 2009; Presgraves, 2010) . However, taxonomists cannot apply the evidence indicative of evolutionary divergence in one scenario to a different one without further analyses. As an example, reciprocal monophyly of neutral unlinked loci for conspecific populations can result from strong genetic drift at the range limit of the species, where rare alleles can rapidly increase in frequency because of random sampling in low-density populations, a pattern that will not be mirrored by high-frequency alleles or those under selection (Excoffier & Ray, 2008) . Thus, taxonomists need to be carefull and critical with the evidence at hand. The cautionary tale is exemplified by the taxonomic deflation that is now observed in some groups of lemurs, where not all differences (even in morphology and DNA sequences) used previously to describe species, evidence lineage divergence (Groeneveld et al., 2009) . We cannot stress enough the corollary of ESC, i.e. that no one should consider a separate species to be a set of organisms that share a mutation in a gene, differ in morphology, or even appear to be reciprocally monophyletic, if there is evidence that those individuals belong to the same population or metapopulation as others not showing such characters. Most defenders of an integrative taxonomy have obviated these relevant implications of considering species as lineages. Even Dayrat (2005), who argues for adopting the ESC, downplays the relevance of morphological characters, and recommends that putative species discovered on the basis of morphology only 'be submitted to the filter of other approaches and additional data' (Dayrat, 2005: 409) . On the contrary, Valdecasas et al. (2008) argue for the superiority of complex anatomical characters over molecular ones, and further consider that within an integrative scenario it is 'foolish' that '. . . trivial characters, such as color, would play the same "weight" in terms of usefulness of evidence' (Valdecasas et al., 2008: 212) . Also, the fact that most taxonomists still demand that every species be described and diagnosed morphologically, despite its limited utility in some groups of organisms (Cohan, 2006; Siddall et al., 2007; Fontaneto et al., 2009; Guil & Giribet, 2009 ), indicates clear preferences for some characters over others. If some characters that have proved to be useful to delimit species for particular groups of organisms are defended as having more weight than others for delimiting species in general, the development of an integrative taxonomy applicable across the tree of life will be largely impeded.
Under the ESC, any kind of character -not only those established by tradition or those more fashionable -can be relevant as far as they provide evidence of lineage divergence.
TO NAME OR NOT TO NAME?
In practice, situations of character incongruence and differences in level of evidence pose a challenge for taxonomists about when to name or not to name divergent lineages. Decisions about species status will be easier in situations of sympatry. Here, differences in fixed characters or reciprocal monophyly in gene genealogies will most surely indicate the presence of distinct, reproductively isolated, species. Paraphyly or polyphyly in gene genealogies, coupled with qualitative or quantitative differences in morphology, might indicate a process of divergence with gene flow (Nosil et al., 2009 ) that will require a more detailed analysis, as in recent adaptive radiations (Shaffer & Thomson, 2007) . Also, as mentioned above, recent studies indicate that population expansion can promote differences in the frequency of some neutral loci (Excoffier & Ray, 2008 ) that would appear as phylogeographic breaks (monophyletic groups), despite the absence of barriers to gene flow. In such situations, the integration of coalescent and ecological niche analyses can help to rigorously assess the ecological exchangeability and degree of gene flow at multiple loci between putative sister lineages (e.g. Bond & Stockman, 2008) .
More controversial will be taxonomic decisions concerning allopatric lineages, where biologists usually disagree about what divergence is enough to consider them as different species (Mallet, 2008) . Diagnosability through fixed character states is the customary criterion used to decide if two allopatric populations deserve to be named as species or not. But almost every population can be diagnosable at some level if we look close enough. For example, nucleotide substitutions at neutral loci can become rapidly fixed in small allopatric populations, and make them diagnosable by private haplotypes (DeSalle, Egan & Sidall, 2005) . Also, the criterion of reciprocal monophyly of gene genealogies may not solve the problem of allopatry because lineage sorting of mitochondrial loci usually happens before divergence in morphology or monophyly of nuclear loci (Zink & Barrowclough, 2008) , which may again lead to differences of opinion about whether an allopatric population is or is not a species. However, this is the problem of cataloguing things that evolve, and, in fact, under the ESC framework any allopatric lineage showing signs of divergence and having no gene flow could be considered a species, despite the fact that other biologists may consider them only as populations, evolutionarily significant units (Moritz, 1994) , or subspecies (Mayr, 1942) , because they do not differ qualitatively, and may not even differ quantitatively from other independently evolving sympatric lineages recognized as species (see above).
But the question is: do we really need to name all those lineages as species? On the one hand, the identification of small and young lineages may be relevant for disciplines that try to understand lineage divergence or character evolution (Bush, 1994) . On the other hand, the proliferation of new species names may be detrimental for the economy of conservation, as it implies a reduction of the 'budget per species' (Isaac, Mallet & Mace, 2004; Meiri & Mace, 2007) .
Although this concern is at the basis of a debate on what should be the target of conservation (species, habitats, biodiversity hotspots, processes, etc.), and how the efforts should be allocated (investment on management actions or on target species) (Mace, Possingham & Leader-Williams, 2006) , taxonomists should be aware of the social implications of their discoveries. Thus, in cases where taxonomists decide to split species of commercial interest (e.g. invasive species and species subject to trade) or endangered species, it could be helpful that they explain about the need to erect a new name, the significance and utility of the discovery, the putative evolutionary process behind the pattern, and the precise distribution and method of re-identification of the organism receiving the new name.
THE EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK
For animals alone, taxonomists describe and name around 15 000-20 000 species each year (Polaszek et al., 2005; Zhang, 2008) . We can hardly imagine any other biological discipline providing more diverse and broadly used hypotheses than taxonomy. But usually, when species names are put in circulation, they tend to be seen as fixed comparative units, forgetting or ignoring that they represent hypotheses that may stand or fall after subsequent testing (Wiley, 1978) . Taxonomists cannot provide immutable hypotheses, but they can provide confidence in their hypotheses through corroboration assessments (Popper, 1959) .
Following Popperian philosophy, systematists have traditionally evaluated the degree of corroboration of phylogenetic hypotheses by assessing the logical improbability of the evidence (character data, i.e. synapomorphies) without the hypothesis (a cladogram), given some background knowledge (descent with modification) (e.g. Kluge, 1997 ; also see a recent review and criticism of several approaches to corroboration by Farris, 2008) . A well-corroborated hypothesis would be one for which the evidence supporting it is improbable without that hypothesis. As an example, under the background knowledge of descent with modification, it is difficult to explain the possession of multiple shared characters (synapomorphies) by humans and chimpanzees without the hypothesis that they are close relatives. Under this formulation, total-evidence is considered to be the best approach to corroboration because only in this way can we assess whether all available evidence is highly improbable or not overall (Kluge, 1997) . Some taxonomists have extended this formulation to species hypotheses, and defend that only total evidence analyses can provide rigorous tests (e.g. Will et al., 2005; Fitzhugh, 2006; Valdecasas et al., 2008; Wheeler, 2008) . In a similar way, Dayrat (2005) considers that we can only have confidence in species hypotheses supported by different lines of evidence. Thus, given the ESC framework, the issue remains whether, in cases of broad character incongruence, we should refute a species hypothesis, or consider it less corroborated, when most sources of evidence contradict it and only one provides support. In other words, can a single line of evidence provide corroboration of a species hypothesis? The answer is yes.
Faith (2004, 2007) has shown that Popperian philosophy has enough space to accommodate additional strategies for corroboration of hypotheses on evolutionary species supported by a single line of evidence (see also Faith & Trueman, 2001) . He suggests that the evidence for a species hypothesis is provided by the fit of observations to the hypothesis, and corroboration will depend on the improbability of such goodness-of-fit without the hypothesis. Here, the evidence is not character data, but the goodness-of-fit between the data (of any kind) and the hypothesis, and corroboration is provided when that goodness-offit is improbable. For example, a hypothesis supported by, say, a coherent pattern of morphological variation with geography, will gain corroboration if we are unable to explain away (i.e. by causes other than lineage divergence) a narrow goodness-of-fit (statistically evaluated) between the observed data and the hypothesis. In the case in which several sets of characters support the hypothesis that an evolutionary species exists, corroboration will be gained if we are able to demonstrate that the congruent pattern supporting the hypothesis is unlikely to have emerged by chance, or that any alternative hypothesis (e.g. correlation among characters, see above, more than one species involved, etc.) provides a better goodness-of-fit. In case that only one character set, among the multiple evaluated ones, supports our species hypothesis, the hypothesis can nonetheless gain corroboration if that goodness-of-fit is improbable. Consider for example fixed differences in characters mediating reproductive isolation (e.g. the call structure of crickets) between two species. Here, our hypothesis about the existence of two species gains corroboration if we are unable to find a better explanation for the call differences indicating an absence of gene flow. Also, several empirical methods such as coalescent-based ones (e.g. Knowles & Carstens, 2007) or methods integrating phylogeographic and population genetic analyses, e.g. those reviewed by Sites & Marshall (2004) , for delimiting evolutionary species can potentially provide corroboration assessments by statistically assessing the goodness-of-fit. As an example, Raxworthy et al. (2007) assessed species limits in two taxonomically complex groups of Malagasy geckos using ecological niche analyses. In several cases they found that niche models based on new species limits provided a better fit to the known distribution than models based upon the combined (lumped) species delimited by morphology, which resulted in the elevation of subspecies to species, and the description of a new species. In other words, the goodness-of-fit (statistically assessed) between ecological data and each of the newly recognized species hypotheses was more improbable (difficult to explain by chance or by the hypothesis of a single, nichegeneralist species) than the goodness-of-fit between ecological data and the lumped species hypotheses. The new species hypotheses were thus more strongly corroborated.
In addition to the aforementioned methods, diagnoses included in species descriptions can also provide some useful information for the corroboration of species hypotheses, even if supported by single lines of evidence. For example, a species diagnosis can make predictions about the occurrence of some unique combinations of fixed character states (indicating lineage divergence), and we can consider a species more corroborated if those combinations do in fact occur (Popper, 1959) . For example, if we state in a diagnosis that specimens of our new species differ from any other species in the same genus by the unique combination of lacking keratinized spicules and having red spots on the dorsum, and we later recurrently find that specimens of some other species share those characters, or that not all specimens of the putative new species present those characters, our species hypotheses will lose corroboration. On the contrary, a species hypothesis supported by a diagnosis that proves to be always applicable, far beyond the specimens and data used in its original description, will gain corroboration. Poor species descriptions are those that rule out too few character combinations in the diagnosis to make them really testable with subsequent study. Although we can probably not gain much corroboration through this approach -an issue that deserves further study -it remains crucial because the majority of new species come from tropical areas or belong to poorly known groups of organisms, and for these there are no precise data about their distribution patterns, ecological niches, and population sizes: information much needed to accurately apply most other methods for delimiting species.
STABILITY OF SPECIES NAMES
As we accept a framework of species as evolutionary units, the demand for species stability becomes a demand for empirical rigour. We cannot expect or demand immutable species hypotheses, but only the most corroborated ones. Independently of the lines of evidence supporting it, a species hypothesis that has been subjected to test and that has gained corroboration, can be considered potentially more stable. In other words, the species name identifying a particular species hypothesis will more likely be stable. Species supported by several independent lines of evidence, even if they have not been submitted to corroboration assessment, can also be regarded as having high potential corroboration, and being therefore more stable (e.g. Glaw et al., 2010) . The hypotheses supported by a single line of evidence and that have not yet been subjected to corroboration assessment, should be considered preliminary hypotheses. In cases when several and independent lines of evidence yield incongruent results about the validity of a species -and we have not yet obtained corroboration for at least one of them -we should consider the hypothesis unstable. Also, unstable hypotheses should be those affected by taxonomic problems (e.g. those belonging to unresolved species complexes). Populations for which there is some, but incomplete, evidence of species status, and which have not received a formal name, can be considered candidate species (Vieites et al., 2009 ).
Unfortunately, current practices do not ensure that, or inform if, a species name circulating as a comparative unit is associated with a rigorous hypothesis -a situation sometimes exacerbated by nomenclatural issues. Therefore, here we encourage taxonomists to provide information about the expected stability of their hypotheses (e.g. Glaw et al., 2010) . A simple and effective way to connect species taxonomy and users of species names would be including information about the degree of stability of species hypotheses in biodiversity databases (e.g. EOL, Species2000, and Zoobank). Users of species names could thus not only track the status of a given name (e.g. valid, synonymized, or nomen nudum), but also the changing expected level of stability of the corresponding species hypotheses. This information could further help conservationists and policy makers by providing a firmer basis for the development of biodiversity assessments.
CONCLUSIONS
Taxonomy, as defended here, aims to discover and name evolutionary species. Species walk along different roads, some with a slow and some with a speedy pace. Therefore, every evolutionary species needs to be identified through the analysis of the particular and diverse biological properties that emerged during its unique evolutionary trajectory. To do so, taxonomists should be able to incorporate theory, methods, and data from all other disciplines studying the origin and evolution of species, should abandon the plea for the superiority of some lines of evidence or approaches above others, and should stop demanding full congruence between lines of evidence. Even so, taxonomists who accept the ESC sometimes want to follow strict, universal criteria for describing new species, yet acceptance of the ESC should instead lead us to be more flexible about characters and criteria for describing species. Thus, despite the fact that morphological studies will retain an outstanding role in taxonomy, the use of disparate lines of evidencefrom nucleotides to whole genomes, from single gene trees to coalescent patterns of gene genealogies, or ecological niche models and behavioural traitsshould help to continue advancing our understanding of Earth's biodiversity. Taxonomists can no longer be satisfied with the broad circulation of a large number of preliminary hypotheses. Corroboration is the next step. Our best biodiversity estimates will depend on the number of corroborated hypotheses we are able to provide.
